This paper proposes a new index of relative wage mobility and uses Mincerian earnings function to derive a breakdown of this mobility into components measuring respectively the impact of human capital, differences in rates of return on human capital and unobservable characteristics. This wage mobility index is also decomposed into wage growth, structural mobility (change in wage inequality) and exchange mobility (re-ranking). An empirical illustration is given, based on the 1983 and 1995 Israeli Censuses.
Introduction
The literature on income inequality and wage dispersion has often taken a static approach to the analysis of income distributions, analyzing for example the trend of inequality in a given country over time or comparing inequality in various countries at a point in time. Much scarcer are the attempts to look at what happened over time to specific individuals or households.
The growing availability of panel data makes it now possible to take a more dynamic view of inequality and to focus one's attention on the concept of mobility rather than on that of inequality but here a distinction has to be made between inter-and intragenerational mobility. The focus of the present paper is on intra-generational mobility but even in this case there is no consensus about the way income and wage mobility should be measured. Fields and Ok (1999) and Fields (2008) in surveys on mobility measurement introduced a second distinction, one that separates studies of macro-mobility from micro-mobility analyses. Macro mobility studies focus on the overall amount of mobility and try to answer questions concerning, for example, the percentage of individuals who stay over time in the same quantile. These quantiles may be defined on the basis of relative thresholds (e.g. population deciles at each period) or fixed thresholds (e.g. income intervals based on the population deciles of the original period), a useful distinction made by Hungerford (1993) as well as by Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) . A typical element ij p in such a transition matrix will therefore indicate the proportion of the total population that was in quantile i in period t but moved to quantile j in period ' t . Various mobility measures have been derived from such matrices. The most popular is probably an index proposed by Shorrocks (1978) which has been used, for example, by Buchinsky, Fougère and Kramarz (1998) , Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) , Canto (2000) and Ramos (1999) . Shorrocks (1978) proposed also mobility indices derived from transition matrices, that obey the period invariance principle, that is, that are not sensitive to the number of periods separating time t from time t'. Other mobility indices derived from transition matrices measure rather the degree of independence between the lines (quantile of origin) and the columns (quantile of destination). Among such measures of independence one may cite the "φ of independence" (Bigard et al., 1998) , the likelihood ratio G 2 (Hungerford, 1993) , an index φ or λ of asymmetry (Bigard et al., 1998; Hungerford, 1993 ),
Cramer's V (Hungerford, 1993) and the correlation ratio which was used by Canto (2000) , Gustafsson (1994) , Hauser and Fabig (1999) and Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) .
Micro mobility studies, on the contrary, deal rather with questions about the determinants of the income or positional changes of individual income recipients (see, Fields, 2008) and it is in fact this aspect of mobility that will be stressed in this paper.
A third distinction to be drawn is that between measures of time-independence and measures of movement. The focus is on time-independence when one is interested in finding out how dependent current income is on past income. The other type of study tries rather to compare the incomes of the same individuals (in intra-generational studies) between one year and another and to discover how much income movement has taken place.
But even here several approaches may be taken. Fields (2008) makes a distinction between five concepts.
The first one is that of "positional movement", the idea being that an individual experiences positional movement if he/she changes quintiles, deciles or ranks. Bartholomew (1973) was probably the first one to propose such a measure but it has been adopted (as such or in a related form) by Bigard et al. (1998) , Buchinsky, Fougère and Kramarz (1998) , Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) , Dickens (2000) , Hauser and Fabig (1999) , Hungerford (1993) , Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007) , Ramos (1999) and Cardoso (2006) .
A second notion is that of share movement and the latter is assumed to take place if an individual's income varies relative to the mean income (e.g. Aaberge et al., 2002) .
Some authors proposed mobility indices taking into account both the change in income and that in ranks. A distinction is then made between the concept of structural mobility (which refers to the "anonymous" change over time in income inequality) and exchange mobility (the focus being here on changes in ranks). This distinction was introduced by Markandya (1982) and may be found also in the works of Silber (1995) , Van Kerm and Jenkins (2003) , Beenstock (2004) and Ruiz-Castillo (2004) .
The third concept is that of non-directional income movement which looks at the extent of fluctuation in individuals' incomes, no matter whether there is an upward or downward movement (see, for example, Fields and Ok, 1996) .
A fourth notion, called directional movement, makes a distinction between the direction of the movement and thus the observer is assumed to care not only about the amount of the income change but also about its direction (see, Fields and OK, 1999a) .
Finally the focus of the fifth notion of income movement is on mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes (see, Fields, forthcoming) and wonders whether the income variations experienced by individuals cause the inequality of longer-term incomes to be different from the inequality of the original incomes One of the most popular measures based on such an approach is again an index originally proposed by Shorrocks (1993) and defined as the complement to one of the ratio of the inequality of the average incomes of the individuals during the period considered over a weighted sum of the inequality of individual incomes in each of the sub-periods considered. Various inequality indices may be used (e.g. Gini index, Theil index, coefficient of variation, mean log deviation of incomes or wages, variance of logarithms). Such an approach may be found in the works of Aaberge et al. (2002) , Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) , Canto (2000) , Gustafsson (1994) , Hofer and Weber (2002) , Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) , Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007) although the latter call this aspect of mobility, earnings volatility. Using an idea originally suggested by Murdoch and Sicular (2002) , Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) have also shown how such an approach allows a decomposition of mobility into between and within groups mobility, where the groups are defined on the basis of the predicted earnings of the individuals, the latter being derived from traditional Mincerian earnings functions.
Several additional points should be stressed. First there have been various attempts to derive axiomatically measures of income mobility and here a distinction should be made between the case where mobility is conceptualized in terms of social welfare (see, King, 1983 , Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark, 1985 , and Ruiz-Castillo, 2004 and that where a descriptive rather than an ethical approach is used and where desirable properties of an income mobility index are specified and then an attempt is made to derive the (family of) indices that have these properties (e.g. Tsui, 2005) .
Another useful distinction is that made between a relative approach to income mobility where the analysis is conducted only in terms of income shares and an absolute approach which is based on the use of income in, say, $ terms.
The focus of the present paper is on intra-generational micro-mobility and it looks at mobility as movement rather than as time independence. It takes a relative approach to mobility but will not only look at the movement of income shares but also at variations in the ranking of the individuals. Finally the income mobility index that has been selected is derived from the welfarist approach to mobility taken by Silber and Weber (2005) . They had suggested three new mobility indices based on a welfarist approach and related to the Gini index. These indices took an absolute approach in the sense that there is no mobility if all incomes increase by the same dollar amount.
These indices were decomposed additively into two or three components. The three indices proposed by Silber and Weber (2005) included a growth and a structural mobility component. Two of them included also an exchange mobility component where such a mobility (which refers to re-ranking) was considered either as welfare increasing or as welfare decreasing.
The present paper extends the approach originally proposed by Silber and Weber (2005) by applying their ideas to the logarithms of incomes (wages), thus taking a relative approach to mobility. But its main contribution is that, on the basis of
Mincerian earnings functions, it shows how such a mobility index, as well as each of its three components, may be decomposed into three elements corresponding respectively to the impact of human capital characteristics, that of the rates of return on these characteristics and as well as that of unobservable characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines a new index of wage mobility while section 3 analyses its properties. Section 4 shows that it is possible to decompose this index into three components measuring respectively the impact of human capital characteristics, the rates of return on these characteristics and unobservable characteristics. Section 5 presents an illustration based on Israeli Census data for the years 1983 and 1995. Concluding comments are finally given in Section 6.
2) Welfare Change and the Measurement of Mobility
The link between social welfare and mobility has been examined at length by Silber and Weber (2005) . The section below summarizes the main elements of their approach.
Using the concept of "equally distributed equivalent level of income" introduced by Atkinson (1970) we may define the Gini index G I as
where y refers to the average income in the population and EG y to the "equally distributed equivalent level of income", derived on the basis of the implicit welfare function that "lies behind" the Gini index (see, Donaldson and Weymark, 1980 , for more details on this welfare function and its generalization). EG y represents therefore the welfare G W of society, assuming the latter is computed on the basis of the social welfare function which is related to the Gini index. Since the Gini index is equal to twice the area lying between the Lorenz curve 1 and the diagonal, the area lying below the Lorenz curve is then equal to half the value of the ratio ) / ( y y EG .
The Generalized Lorenz curve (see, Shorrocks, 1983 ) is derived by multiplying the variable on the vertical axis of the Lorenz curve (cumulative income shares) by the average income. The area lying between a generalized Lorenz curve and a straight line joining the origin and a point with coordinates 1 on the horizontal axis and the mean income y on the vertical axis will therefore be equal to half the Gini index times the mean income. On the other hand we also know that the Gini index is equal to half the mean difference ∆ divided by the mean income, where the mean difference ∆ is defined as
where i y ( ) j y is the income of individual ) ( j i and n the total number of individuals.
The "equally distributed equivalent level of income", EG y , may thus be defined as
so that the area S lying below the Generalized Lorenz curve may be expressed as
since, as mentioned previously, the area below the Lorenz curve is equal to 
Note that in defining the welfare of society at times 0 and 1 we have assumed in (5) that we rank the individuals at time t by the incomes they received at time t
We may however imagine computing the change in welfare between times 0 and 1 by assuming that the incomes of the individuals changed but not their rank. We would then define the welfare at time 1 on the basis of the incomes the individuals had at time 1 but of the ranks they had at time 0. Similarly we could define the welfare at time 0 on the basis of the incomes the individuals had at time 0 but of the ranks they had at time 1. This is a standard issue in the theory of index numbers and Deutsch and Silber (1999) have shown that this problem exists also when measuring income inequality.
We may therefore think of an alternative way of defining the change in welfare and express it as
In (6) 1 ∆ P refers to what could be called the "Pseudo-Mean Differences" at time 1, this "Pseudo-Mean Difference" being equal to twice the product of the mean income by the "Pseudo-Gini index" 2 .
2 One uses the expression of "Pseudo-Gini index" rather than that of "Gini index" when, in computing the Gini index at, say, time t, we rank the individuals not according to the income they had at time t but according to another ranking criteria, such as, for example, the income they had at another time, say,
. For more details on the concept of " Peudo-Gini", see, Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 1979, or Silber, 1989. We may even think of a third way of defining the change in welfare and express it as
In (7) 0 ∆ P refers to the "Pseudo-Mean Difference" at time 0.
We will now assume that the three ways of defining the change in social welfare between times 0 and 1 ) , , ( 
When comparing (8) and (9) 
When comparing (8), (9) and (10) The choice between these three ways of measuring overall mobility should therefore depend on how one looks at re-ranking. It can be ignored, be considered as having a positive impact on social welfare or assumed to have a negative effect on welfare.
In defining previously the Gini index as being equal to half the ratio of the mean difference of the incomes over the (arithmetic) mean income, we define it in fact as half the ratio of the absolute value of the expected income gap (in $ terms) between two individuals selected randomly (with repetition) over the average income.
If instead of computing the Gini index of the individual incomes (expressed in $ terms), we compute half the mean difference 3 of the logarithms of these individual incomes, we estimate in fact half the value of the expected percentage difference (in absolute value) of the incomes of two individuals selected randomly with repetition (see, Deutsch and Silber, 2008) . This is clearly not the same as the Gini index of the incomes but it is conceptually similar. In both cases we estimate the expected percentage difference between the incomes of two individuals. In the first case however this percentage is estimated with respect to the overall average income while in the second case it somehow estimated with respect to the average of the incomes that have been randomly selected.
Given this similarity between these two approaches we will from now on define income (wage) mobility on the basis of the logarithms of the incomes (wages). This will allow us combining the use of the mean difference of the logarithms of the wages with the literature on Mincerian earnings functions where the dependent variable is precisely the logarithm of wages.
On the Definition of Wage Mobility Indices
The algorithm described in section 2 to compute the Gini index (defined there as half the ratio of the mean difference over the mean income) is not the only way of computing the Gini index. One, among the many other algorithms that have been proposed to compute the Gini index G I of the individual incomes, defines it (see, Berrebi and Silber, 1987) as
where n is the number of individuals in the population, i y the income of individual i , y the average income and it is assumed that . ... ...
Recalling the definition of the Gini index in terms of the mean difference that was mentioned previously, we may apply the index defined in expression (11) to the logarithms of wages and derive that the mean difference of the logarithms of wages may be expressed as Combining (9) and (12) we may express the overall wage mobility based on the second approach to mobility measurement, one that assumes that growth and exchange mobility have a positive impact on welfare while an inequality change (structural mobility) will have a positive (negative) effect on welfare if it is a inequality decrease (increase), as 
Properties of the Wage Mobility Index

1) Equal dollar additions to all wages
If a sum a is added to all wages, there will be no exchange mobility, since there will be no re-ranking. There will however be wage growth and structural mobility. More precisely each wage will increase by this amount a so that ) ln( ln . This element will be positive if a>0 and negative if a<0.
Similarly structural mobility which appears as the second element on the R.H.S of (13), becomes
This element will be positive if a>0 and negative if a<0.
When a>0, the element
The overall mobility ) (M will therefore be expressed as This total amount of mobility will thus be positive if a>0 and negative if a<0.
2) Multiplying all wages by a constant:
If all wages are multiplied by a constant ) 1 ( k + , there will evidently be no variation in the amount of structural mobility because this element is equal to
There will also be no re-ranking. The only impact of such changes in the wages will be on the growth component. More precisely the mean (geometric) wage will be multiplied by
Hence total mobility will be equal to
3
) The impact of transfers:
Assume an amount γ is transferred from individual i with wage i y 0 at time 0 to individual j who has a wage We will also suppose that this transfer does not involve any re-ranking. This transfer will modify the mean logarithm of wages and it will also have an impact on the structural mobility component. Clearly with no re-ranking there will be no exchange mobility.
Mobility will therefore be expressed as 
It may be observed that the first expression is positive while the second term is negative but smaller than the first expression, given the concavity of the logarithmic function. Hence mobility will be positive.
4) The case of "population replication"
Assume that instead of having one individual earning wage i y 0 at time 0 n i … 1 = (where n is the original size of the population) we now have m individuals earning the wage i y 0 at time 1 (
This corresponds to what Dalton (1920) called the principle of population. Clearly such a change will not have any impact on the average logarithms of wages so that there will be no growth. It is easy to show that there will also be no structural mobility and no re-ranking. As a consequence a "population replication" does not induce any wage mobility.
5) The case of an "income swap"
Assume that between times 0 and 1 the wages of two individuals i and j are swapped so that . Clearly the average logarithms of wages will not change so that the growth component of mobility will be equal to zero. In addition there will not be any structural mobility. However, there will be exchange mobility.
We will have
This expression is positive since by assumption More precisely this wage mobility will be greater, the greater the wage and rank difference between the two individuals whose wages were swapped. If the permutation of wages is more complex, it can always be translated into the sum of a certain number of swaps so that the result that was just mentioned applies also to this more general case.
Estimating the contributions of the explanatory variables, the regression coefficients of these variables and unobservable characteristics to the relative wage mobility
Let us now apply Oaxaca's (1973) decomposition of the difference between the average (geometric) wages in two periods to the definition of mobility given previously. As in Oaxaca (1973) we start by defining the semi-logarithmic wage function originally proposed by Mincer (1974) as
where l denotes human capital characteristic l 5 , l β is the vector of rates of return on the various human capital characteristics l at time t 6 , i u is the vector of the residuals of the regression, representing the impact of unmeasured human capital characteristics. We will call lt x the vector of the mean values of human capital characteristic l at time t .
The difference between the average values of the logarithms of wages at time 0 and 1, which is approximately equal to the growth rate of the wages between times 0 and 1, may therefore be expressed as
Expression (20) shows that growth may be caused either by changes between the two periods in the average levels of human capital characteristics or/and in the rates of return on these human capital characteristics. Expression (20) Following Reimers (1983) we may then write that
5 More generally l refers to an explanatory variable since some explanatory variables may not be human capital characteristics. For simplicity we will keep using the expression "human capital characteristics". 6 More generally l β is the coefficient of the explanatory variable l but, for simplicity, we will keep using the expression rate of return on the human capital characteristic.
The second element of the measure of mobility previously described measures structural change, which is the pure change in relative inequality that was observed during this same period.
We can now decompose this structural mobility and write that Using the well-known result according to which
we end up with 1983 and 1995) but, on the other hand, the sample size is big and there is no sample attrition. This is particularly useful when long-term mobility (12 years) is being investigated. 
Estimating earnings functions
The estimation of such earnings functions raises two issues. First, there may be a endogeneity bias because of individual unobserved heterogeneity. There are indeed some individual characteristics such as motivation, abilities that are not observed and they may affect some explanatory variables such as education, experience or occupation as well as the dependent variable, wages. The parameters can thus be biased. Two main strategies have been proposed in the literature to deal with individual unobserved heterogeneity. The first one consists of applying instrumental variables methods such as Heckman's two step procedure (1979) . Our data however do not provide such instruments.
The second approach requires having data for different periods of time so that one can apply OLS to a model in first differences. This method considers therefore that the wage growth between two periods rather than the wage level is the dependent variable and this wage growth is then regressed on the change of individual characteristics that took place between two periods. With such a transformation all the time-invariant characteristics are eliminated as well as the individual unobserved heterogeneity 9 so that the parameters will be estimated without bias. Since in this study we need to estimate the parameters of time-invariant explicative variables, we cannot apply it. This is why we propose another approach. We suggest introducing dummy variables A second source of bias is the potential existence of unobserved group heterogeneity.
The argument here is that each group may have unobserved characteristics linked to their area of origin and such characteristics may affect both the wage and the explanatory variables, in particular education, experience and seniority. In other words we may want to assume that the response of an individual belongs to a kind of group specific fuzzy set, that is, the response of an individual may be endogenous and depend on the group to which he/she belongs. Such an endogeneity bias would clearly prevent us from comparing parameters between groups. For example, we could not rank the groups as far as the returns on individual characteristics are concerned because differences in returns may be due to differences in unobserved group characteristics. To solve this issue, we propose using a normalized measure of the explanatory variables 10 (e.g. education, experience, seniority, their squares and their interactions). As an illustration of the proposed standardization approach we take the case of education and propose to define a standardized educational variable First we observe that when method B rather than method A is adopted, the coefficients in the regression are reduced, especially those of the educational variable, and such a result seems to be coherent with the idea that in using method B we succeed in controlling unobserved individual heterogeneity. One may also note that there are small differences in the ranking of the coefficients when method B is compared with method C, Let us now turn to the results obtained when adopting method C. We obviously cannot directly interpret the coefficients but we can compare the results obtained for the various groups as well as observe differences over time. It appears that the rates of return on education among the Easterners were equal to 119.6% in 1983 but had a non significant effect in 1995. Those for the Westerners were equal to 115% in 1983 and 200.2% in 1995 while those for those born in Israel were equal to 246.1% in 1983 and 246.7% in 1995. Consequently, whereas the returns on education increase over time for Westerners, they fall and become insignificant for Easterners. This result suggests that there are differences between the groups in the quality of education and that such differences became even deeper over time.
As far as experience is concerned, the data of Tables 2.1 and among Westerners 11.9% and 13.7%.
Decomposing wage mobility
These earnings functions were then used to apply the wage mobility decomposition techniques described previously. Table 3 gives the value of the mobility index separately for the three subgroups 11 as well as the decomposition of wage mobility into the three components corresponding respectively to growth, structural mobility and exchange mobility. It should be stressed that since the dummy variables measuring the position of the individuals at the other Census were introduced to serve as proxies for the unobserved individual characteristics, these variables will be assumed to be part of the "unobservables".
It appears that the growth component was equal to almost 30% for Easterners, 27%
for Westerners and 41% for individuals born in Israel. When we look at the specific contributions of human capital characteristics, rates of return on these characteristics and "unobservables" to this growth component, we first observe that none of these three components was significant among Easterners, since the bootstrap intervals (see, Efron and Gong, 1983 , for more details on this technique) given in Table 3 include for each of these components the value zero. This result suggests that the different contributions to wage growth among Easterners are quite heterogeneous at the individual level. This would imply that the contribution of wage growth to the overall mobility may be due to human capital characteristics for some individuals but to the rates of return on these characteristics or to the "unobservables" for other individuals.
In other words there is no general rule for this group whose members seem to have different types of wage mobility.
For Westerners or for the group of individuals born in Israel, Table 3 indicates that the most important contribution to wage growth is that of the coefficient of the explanatory variables, what we have labeled previously "rates of return on the human capital characteristics". Among those born in Israel, for example, the growth component was equal to 41% of which 29% is due to the contribution of rates of return. Similarly, among Westerners the contribution of rates of return is of 33%. As 11 The database we used included only Jews so that the subgroups of the Jewish population correspond to different continents of birth.
previously mentioned, this contribution is not significant among Easterners. Since these rates of return depend on market conditions, their magnitude may not be the same in 1983 and 1995, and this is probably why the contribution of the rates of return is so important for the wage growth of Westerners and of those born in Israel.
One should however stress that this variation in the coefficients of variables such as education or industry may concern only some educational categories or some specific industries, in particular those which are much in demand. As a consequence, if Easterners have a rather low level of education or if they often work in industries in decline, they will not benefit from the change in the rates of return. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 seem to confirm this hypothesis since we observe that the mean educational level is lower among Easterners and that they are less represented in dynamic industries such as financing and business services, or in an occupation like management.
Finally, we may note that the contribution of human capital characteristics is significant and positive for those born in Israel (4.9%) whereas it is significant and negative for Westerners (-8.2%). Such a result would suggest that, among those born in Israel but not among Westerners, the mean human capital characteristics are of higher value in 1995 than in 1983. This seems to be confirmed by the descriptive statistics since we may observe in Table 1 that the proportion of individuals in management or in the scientific and academic sector increased by 3.1% and 9% for Westerners but by 19.3% and 12.3% for those born in Israel. We can thus expect that, on average, the change in human capital characteristics was higher among those born in Israel than among Westerners.
Table 3 also indicates that the structural mobility component (measuring the pure change in relative inequality) was significantly negative for all the three groups, but its impact is quite small (-3.4% for Easterners, -2% for those born in Israel and -3.8%
for Westerners). Note however that this reduction in wage inequality is mostly the consequence of the "unobservables", which could, for example, reflect the impact of policies aiming at helping those with the lowest wages.
As far as exchange mobility is concerned, Table 3 indicates that its magnitude is the same (0.18) for each of the three groups and that this exchange mobility is also mainly explained by the "unobservables". In other words it is not education or experience that influence exchange mobility but rather unobserved individual characteristics such as motivation, abilities or social capital. Needless to say, in such a case, it is much more difficult for policy makers to devise measures having an impact on this kind of mobility.
Finally we may also observe that the overall wage mobility is much higher among those born in Israel than among the two other groups. A look in Table 4 at the confidence intervals based on the bootstrap technique confirms that mobility is significantly higher among individuals born in Israel and slightly higher among Easterners than Westerners. Table 4 summarizes the results of the decomposition of the wage mobility into human capital, rates of return and unobservable characteristics
components. It appears that among Easterners the overall mobility is equal to 44% of which almost 28% are due to differences in "unobservables" (a share of 62%, as indicated in Table 5 ). Note that the contribution of the other components is not significant. Such a result may suggest two things. First, wage mobility among Easterners is mostly due to unobserved characteristics such as motivation, abilities or social capital rather than to education or experience. Such a conclusion makes in fact sense if we assume, which is generally true, that education in this group is of a lower quality. Second, as a whole, the group of Easterners is rather heterogeneous.
Among individuals born in Israel the overall mobility index is equal to 57% of which 29% (corresponding to a share of 51%, as shown in Table 5 ) are related to rates of return on human capital characteristics, that is, to the impact of the regression coefficients and 6.3% (a share of 11.1%, as seen in Table 5 ) to human capital characteristics. One may observe that, for those born in Israel, the contribution of the "unobservables" to the overall mobility is not significant.
Finally, among Westerners, the mobility index is equal to 41% of which 31% (which, as indicated in Table 5 , corresponds to a share of 77%) is due to rates of return on human capital characteristics. The impact of the other two components is not significant for this population subgroup. One should stress that even though it appears that among Westerners the impact of rates of return (the regression coefficients) is higher than among those born in Israel, the bootstrap confidence intervals show that this percentage difference (51% versus 77%) is not significant. Since the contribution of the "unobservables" is not significant, we may conclude that the exogenous variables introduced in our model explain quite well the degree of wage mobility among Westerners and those born in Israel.
Conclusion
In the present paper a new index of wage mobility was defined and broken-down into three elements measuring respectively the average wage growth (in percentage terms), the change in wage dispersion (gap between the mean differences of the logarithms of wages in both periods) and the change in the ranking of the individuals.
We then extended Oaxaca's (1973) approach to decompose the first element which measures wage growth into components reflecting respectively the impact of human capital characteristics, rates of return on these characteristics and "unobservables".
The second element of the wage mobility index is called structural mobility and is due to changes in wage inequality. It was broken down into three components measuring respectively the impact of changes in human capital characteristics, in the rates of return on these characteristics and in unobserved characteristics. The third component of the overall wage mobility is called exchange mobility and assumes that re-ranking has a positive impact on mobility. This exchange mobility was broken down into two components measuring respectively the impact of human capital characteristics and of unobserved characteristics.
The empirical illustration focused on wage mobility in Israel between 1983 and 1995.
It showed that wage mobility was significantly higher among Jews born in Israel, and that for this group wage mobility is mainly due to the rates of return on human capital characteristics and the human capital characteristics. In trying to explain this difference between the degree of wage mobility among those born in Israel and among Easterners and Westerners, we stressed several points. First, among Easterners, human capital characteristics (e.g. education) are probably of lower quality and thus less likely to contribute to wage mobility. "Unobservables" such as social capital or abilities play certainly a greater role. Second, we advanced the hypothesis that the population which constitutes the subgroup of Easterners is much more heterogeneous so that there is much more diversity in the types of individual wage mobility. Third, among Westerners, the main determinants of wage mobility, in particular of wage growth, are the rates of return on human capital characteristics. In fact we observed that the average level of human capital characteristics among Westerners did not increase between 1983 and 1995 whereas such an increase occurred among those born in Israel. One possible explanation for such a difference is that lifelong learning may have been more difficult for Westerners, a group composed of individuals who were born abroad and had thus already to face all the difficulties related to the assimilation process in a new country. 
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